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Table 1 DiD estimates: effect of lunchtime and after-school care on vote outcomes

From: How the provision of childcare affects attitudes towards maternal employment

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Provision

2.91***

2.50***

2.08***

1.80***

 

(0.597)

(0.702)

(0.579)

(0.600)

Regulation

− 9.71***

− 8.72***

− 7.66***

 
 

(0.503)

(0.543)

(0.930)

 

Municipality FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Ballot FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Inc. tax

No

No

Yes

No

Canton x ballot FE

No

No

No

Yes

Number of mun.

915

742

915

915

Number of obs.

3658

2966

3658

3658

  1. This table presents the DiD estimates, \(\hat {\gamma _{1}}\) and \(\hat {\gamma _{2}}\), of Eq. (1). The regulation coefficient shows the differential change in vote outcomes of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to municipalities in cantons without regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools, controlling for the differences in provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those which do not. Inc. tax consists of the income tax (cantonal + municipality + church taxes) for singles, married couples with no children, and married couples with two children, each for yearly net incomes of CHF 80,000.-, 100,000.-, 150,000.-, and 200,000.-. In specification (4), canton × municipality FE are applied, and the regulation coefficient can no longer be identified due to collinearity. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account for the fact that municipalities differ in their population. The numbers in parentheses show the standard errors, clustered at the municipal level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01