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Table 1 DiD estimates: effect of lunchtime and after-school care on vote outcomes

From: How the provision of childcare affects attitudes towards maternal employment

  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Provision 2.91*** 2.50*** 2.08*** 1.80***
  (0.597) (0.702) (0.579) (0.600)
Regulation − 9.71*** − 8.72*** − 7.66***  
  (0.503) (0.543) (0.930)  
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ballot FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc. tax No No Yes No
Canton x ballot FE No No No Yes
Number of mun. 915 742 915 915
Number of obs. 3658 2966 3658 3658
  1. This table presents the DiD estimates, \(\hat {\gamma _{1}}\) and \(\hat {\gamma _{2}}\), of Eq. (1). The regulation coefficient shows the differential change in vote outcomes of municipalities in cantons with regulation compared to municipalities in cantons without regulation regarding lunchtime and after-school care in public schools, controlling for the differences in provision within the treated cantons. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities which introduce lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those which do not. Inc. tax consists of the income tax (cantonal + municipality + church taxes) for singles, married couples with no children, and married couples with two children, each for yearly net incomes of CHF 80,000.-, 100,000.-, 150,000.-, and 200,000.-. In specification (4), canton × municipality FE are applied, and the regulation coefficient can no longer be identified due to collinearity. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account for the fact that municipalities differ in their population. The numbers in parentheses show the standard errors, clustered at the municipal level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01