| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
---|
Provision | 1.77** | 2.39*** | 2.68*** | 1.40** | |
| (0.729) | (0.751) | (0.694) | (0.632) | |
D.cost >p50 × prov. | | -1.46 | | | |
| | (1.053) | | | |
Cost × prov. | | | -0.13** | -0.11** | |
| | | (0.056) | (0.045) | |
Municipality FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Canton x ballot FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Covariates | No | No | No | Yes | |
Number of mun. | 804 | 804 | 804 | 804 | |
Number of obs. | 3214 | 3214 | 3214 | 3214 | |
- This table presents the DiD estimate of the provision effect for municipalities in the canton of Bern only. The provision coefficient estimates the differential change in vote outcomes in municipalities introducing lunchtime and after-school care as a consequence of the new regulation compared to those that do not. All four specifications include canton × ballot fixed effects. Specification (2) includes an interaction term of provision and a dummy variable indicating per capita costs of lunchtime and after-school care that surpass median costs. Specifications (3) and (4) include an interaction term of provision and a continuous per capita costs variable. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Covariates include voter turnout, municipality tax multiplier, immigration rate, emigration rate, and birth rate. In all specifications, population weights are applied to account for the fact that municipalities differ in their size. The numbers in parentheses show the standard errors, clustered at the municipality level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01